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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown huge
superiority over humans in image recognition, speech processing,
autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, recent
studies indicate that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples
(AEs) which are designed by attackers to fool deep learning
models. Different from real examples, AEs can mislead the model
to predict incorrect outputs while hardly be distinguished by
human eyes, therefore threaten security-critical deep-learning
applications. In recent years, the generation and defense of
AEs have become a research hotspot in the field of artificial
intelligence (AI) security. This article reviews the latest research
progress of AEs. First, we introduce the concept, cause, char-
acteristics and evaluation metrics of AEs, then give a survey on
the state-of-the-art AE generation methods with the discussion of
advantages and disadvantages. After that, we review the existing
defenses and discuss their limitations. Finally, future research
opportunities and challenges on AEs are prospected.
Index Terms—Artificial intelligence, Deep neural networks,
Adversarial examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, DNNs have shown great advantagesin autonomous vehicles, robotics, network security, im-
age/speech recognition and natural language processing. For
example, in 2017, an intelligent robot with the superior face
recognition ability, named XiaoDu developed by Baidu, de-
feated a representative from the team of humans strongest
brain with the score of 3:2 [1]. On October 19th, 2017,
AlphaGo Zero released by the DeepMind team of Google
shocked the world. Compared with the previous AlphaGo,
AlphaGo Zero relies on reinforcement learning without any
prior knowledge to grow chess skills and finally defeats every
human competitor [2].
For AI research, the United States received huge support
from the government, such as the Federal Research Fund.
In October 2016, the United States issued the projects of
Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence and the
National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development
Strategic Plan, which raised AI to the national strategic level
and formulated ambitious blueprints [3], [4]. In 2017, China
issued the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development
Plan, which mentioned that the scale of the AI core industries
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Fig. 1. The framework towards adversarial examples for this review.
would exceed 150 billion CNY by 2020, promoting the
development of related industries to enlarge their scale to more
than 1 trillion CNY. In the same year, AI was written into
the nineteenth National Congress report, which pushed the
development of AI industries to a new height and filled the
gap in the top-level strategy of AI development [5].
In the early stage of AI, people paid more attention to the
basic theory and application research. With the rapid devel-
opment of AI, security issues have attracted great attention.
For example, at the Shenzhen Hi-tech Fair on November 16,
2016, a robot named Chubby suddenly broke down and hit the
booth glass without any instructions and injured the pedestrian,
which was the world’s first robot injury incident [6]. In July
2016, a crime-killing robot, Knightscope, manufactured by
Silicon Valley Robotics, knocked down and injured a 16-
month-old boy at the Silicon Valley shopping center [7]. At 22
o’clock, March 22, 2018, an Uber autonomous test vehicle hit
the 49-year-old woman named Elaine Herzberg who died after
being sent to the hospital for invalid treatment in the suburbs
of Tempe, Arizona. This is the first fatal autonomous vehicle
accident in the world [8].
In the past decade, various attacks on AI systems have
emerged [9]–[14], [16]–[18]. At the training stage, poisoning
attacks [12]–[14] can damage the original probability distribu-
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Fig. 2. A three-layer neural network model with the known inputs and
weights.
tion of training data by injecting malicious examples to reduce
the prediction accuracy of the model. At the test or inference
stage, evasion attacks [15]–[18] can trick a target system by
constructing a specific input example without changing the
target machine learning system. In 2005, Lowd and Meek [19]
proposed the concept of adversarial learning, in which an ad-
versary conducts an attack to minimize a cost function. Under
this framework, they proposed an algorithm to reverse engineer
linear classifiers. In 2006, Barreno et al. [20] presented a
taxonomy of different types of attacks on machine learning
systems. In order to mitigate poisoning attacks and evasion
attacks, a lot of defenses have been proposed [10], [11], [21]–
[23]. In 2014, Szegedy et al. [24] proposed the concept of
adversarial example (AE). By adding a slight perturbation
to the input, the model misclassifies the adversarial example
with high confidence, while human eyes cannot recognize
the difference. Even though different models have different
architectures and training data, the same set of AEs can be
used to attack related models. AEs have shown a huge threat
to DNNs. For example, the classifier may misclassify an adver-
sarial image of the stop traffic sign as a speed limit sign of 45
km/h, resulting in a serious traffic accident [25]. In the image
captioning system, an image is used as input to generate some
captions to describe the image which is perturbed by attackers
to generate some image-independent, completely opposite or
even malicious captions [26]. In the malware detection, the
machine learning (ML)-based visualization malware detectors
are vulnerable to AE attacks, where a malicious malware may
be classified as a benign one by adding a slight perturbation
on the transformed grayscale images [9].
In recent years, many AE construction methods and defense
techniques have been proposed. This survey elaborates on the
related research and development status of AE on DNNs since
it was proposed in [24]. The overall framework is shown in
Fig. ??.
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Fig. 3. Generating an adversarial example with the fast gradient sign
method, “.007” corresponds to a small value  that restricts the norm of the
perturbation, sign(∇XJ(θ,X, y)) represents an imperceptible perturbation
[27].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Neural Network
Artificial neural network (ANN) simulates the human brains
nervous system to process complex information and consists
of many interconnected neurons. Each neuron represents a
specific output function called the activation function. The
connection between two neurons represents the weight of
the signal. The neural network connects many single neurons
together by weights to simulate the human brain to process
information.
As shown in Fig. 2, a three-layer neural network is com-
posed of an input layer L1, a hidden layer L2 and an output
layer L3, where the circle represents the neuron of the neural
network; the circle labeled “+1” represents the bias unit; the
circles labeled “X1”, “X2”, “X3” are the inputs. Neurons in
different layers are connected by weights W. We use a(l)i to
represent the activation value (output value) of the i-th unit
in l-th layer, when l = 1, a(1)i =Xi. With the given inputs and
weights, the function output h(W,b)(X) can be calculated. The
specific steps are as follows:
a
(2)
1 = f(W
(1)
11 X1 +W
(1)
12 X2 +W
(1)
13 X3 + b
(1)
11 ); (1)
a
(2)
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(1)
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(1)
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(1)
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(1)
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(1)
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32 X2 +W
(1)
33 X3 + b
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(2)
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The above calculation process is called forward propagation
(FP), which is a transfer process of input information through
the hidden layer to the output layer. The activation function
ReLU: f(X) = max{0, X} is used to nonlinearize the neural
network between different hidden layers. When the machine
learning task is a binary classification, the final output layer
uses the activation function sigmoid: f(X) = 1/(1 + e(−X)).
When the machine learning task is a multi-class problem, the
final output layer uses the activation function softmax: f(X) =
eXk∑N
i=1 e
Xi
, k = 1, 2, ...N . In the training process, the weights
W and the bias b connecting the neurons in different layers
are determined by back propagation.
Neural networks belong to a cross-disciplinary research field
combining computer, probability, statistics, and brain science.
They focus on how to enable computers to simulate and
implement human learning behaviors, so as to achieve bet-
ter automatic knowledge acquisition. However, recent studies
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show that neural networks are particularly vulnerable to AEs
which are generated by adding small perturbations to the
inputs. In what follows, we will discuss the AEs in detail.
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In 2014, Szegedy et al. [24] proposed adversarial examples
to fool DNNs. Adding a subtle perturbation to the input of
the neural network will produce an error output with high
confidence, while human eyes cannot recognize the difference.
Suppose that there are a machine learning model M and an
original example C which can be correctly classified by the
model, i.e., M(C) = ytrue, where ytrue is the true label of C.
However, it is possible to construct an adversarial example C
′
which is perceptually indistinguishable from C but is classified
incorrectly, i.e., M(C
′
) 6= ytrue [24]. A typical example is
shown in Fig. 3, the model considers the original image to be
a “panda” (57.7%). After adding a slight perturbation to the
original image, it is classified as a “gibbon” by the same model
with 99.3% confidence, while the human eyes completely
cannot distinguish the differences between the original image
and the adversarial image [27].
In order to facilitate the reader to understand AEs intuitively,
we use the neural network model in Fig. 2 as an example to
show the change of the outputs by perturbing the inputs. As
shown in Fig. 4, W(1) and W(2) are the weight matrices. After
adding a small perturbation sign (0.5) to the original inputs,
the adversarial inputs X
′
1, X
′
2, X
′
3 are equal to 1.5. Then,
through the first layer’s weight matrix W(1) and the transform
operation of the activation function ReLU, the output values
a
′(2)
1 , a
′(2)
2 , a
′(2)
3 are equal to 1.5. Finally, after passing the
second layer’s weight matrix W(2) and the activation function
sigmoid transform operation, the probability of the output
is changed from 0.2689 to 0.8176, which makes the model
misclassify the image with high confidence. With the increase
of the model depth, the probability of the output changes more
obviously.
A. Cause of Adversarial Examples
AE is a serious vulnerability in deep learning systems and
cannot be ignored in security-critical AI applications. How-
ever, in current research, there are no well-recognized explana-
tions on why the AEs can be constructed. Analyzing the cause
of AEs can help researchers to fix the vulnerability effectively.
The reason may be overfitting or insufficient regularization of
the model which leads to insufficient generalization ability that
learning models predict unknown data. However, by adding
perturbations to a regularized model, Goodfellow et al. [27]
found that the effectiveness against AEs was not improved
significantly. Other researchers [28] suspected that AEs arose
from extreme nonlinearity of deep neural networks. However,
if the input dimensions of a linear model are high enough, AEs
can also be constructed successfully with high confidence by
adding small perturbations to the inputs.
Goodfellow et al. [27] believed that the reason for gener-
ating AEs is the linear behavior in high dimensional space.
In the high dimensional linear classifier, each individual input
feature is normalized. For one dimension of each input, small
perturbations will not change the overall prediction of the
classifier. However, small perturbations to all dimensions of
the inputs will lead to an effective change of the output.
As shown in Fig. 5, the score of class ’1’ is improved
from 5% to 88% by adding or subtracting 0.5 to each di-
mension of the original example X in a particular direction.
It demonstrates that linear models are vulnerable to AEs and
refutes the hypothesis that the existence of AEs is due to the
high nonlinearization of the model. Therefore, the existence
of high-dimensional linear space may be the cause of AEs.
B. Characteristics of Adversarial Examples
In general, AEs have three characteristics:
Transferability. AEs are not limited to attack a specific
neural network. It is unnecessary to obtain architecture and
parameters of the model when constructing AEs, as long as
the model is trained to perform the same task. AEs generated
from one model M1 can fool a different model M2 with
a similar probability. Therefore, an attacker can use AEs to
attack the models that perform the same task, which means that
an attacker can construct AEs in the known machine learning
model and then attack related unknown models [29].
Regularization effect. Adversarial training [27] can reveal
the defects of models and improve the robustness. However,
compared to other regularization methods, the cost of con-
structing a large number of AEs for adversarial training is
expensive. Unless researchers can find shortcuts for construct-
ing AEs in the future, they are more likely to use dropout [30]
or weight decay (L2 regularization).
Adversarial instability. In the physical world, it is easy to
lose the adversarial ability for AEs after physical transforma-
tions such as translation, rotation, and lighting. In this case,
AEs will be correctly classified by the model. This instability
characteristic challenges attackers to construct robust AEs and
creates the difficulty of deploying AEs in the real world.
C. Evaluation Metrics
1) Success Rate: When constructing AEs, the success rate
is the most direct and effective evaluation criterion. In general,
the success rate to generate AEs is inversely proportional to
the magnitude of perturbations. For example, the fast gradient
sign method [27] requires a large perturbation and is prone to
label leaking [32] that the model correctly classifies the AE
generated with the true label and misclassifies the AE created
with the false label. Therefore, the success rate is much lower
than the iterative method [33] with the lower perturbation and
the Jacobian-based saliency map attack method [31] with the
specific perturbation. Usually, it is difficult to construct AEs
with 100% success rate.
2) Robustness: The robustness of machine learning models
is related to the classification accuracy [34], [35]. Better ma-
chine learning models are less vulnerable to AEs. Robustness
is a metric to evaluate the resilience of DNNs to AEs. In
general, a robust DNN model has two features [36] [37]:
• The model has high accuracy both inside and outside of
the dataset;
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Fig. 6. Visualizing the metric of robustness: This 2D representation
illustrates the metric as the radius of the disc at the original example X and
going through the closest adversarial example X∗ constructed from X [63].
• The classifier of a smoothing model can classify inputs
consistently near a given example.
We first define the robustness of classifiers f(X) to adver-
sarial perturbations in the input space Rd. Given an input X
∈ Rd from µ (the probability measure of the data points that
we wish to classify), ∆adv(X, F ) is denoted as the norm of
the smallest perturbation to make models misclassified.
∆adv(X, F ) = min
r∈Rd
||r||2,
subject to F (X)F (X + r) ≤ 0,
(5)
where the perturbation r aims to flip the label of X, correspond-
ing to the minimal distance from X to the decision boundary
of the classifier.
The robustness of a DNN model F to adversarial perturba-
tions is defined as the average of ∆adv(X, F ) over all X, and
the corresponding expression is
ρadv(F ) = Eµ[∆adv(X, F )]. (6)
As shown in Fig. 6, the outputs of the classifier are constant
inside the circle with a radius of ∆adv(X, F ). However, the
classified results of all samples X∗ outside the circle are
different from X. Therefore, the magnitude of the perturbation
∆adv(X, F ) is proportional to the robustness of the model, i.e.,
the higher the minimum perturbation needed to misclassify the
example, the stronger the robustness of the DNN is.
3) Transferability: AEs generated for one machine learning
model can be used to misclassify another model even if both
models have different architectures and training data. This
property is called transferability. AEs can be transferred among
different models because a contiguous subspace with a large
dimension in the adversarial space is shared among different
models [38]. This transferability provides a tremendous advan-
tage for AEs because attackers only need to train alternative
models to construct AEs and deploy them to attack the target
model.
The transferability of AEs can be measured by the transfer
rate, i.e., the ratio of the number of transferred AEs to the total
number of AEs constructed by the original model. In the non-
targeted attack, the percentage of the number of AEs generated
by one model that are correctly classified by another model
is used to measure the non-targeted transferability. It is called
the accuracy rate. A lower accuracy rate means a better non-
targeted transfer rate. In the targeted attack, the percentage
of the AEs generated by one model that can be classified
by another model as the target label is used to measure the
targeted transferability. It is referred to as the matching rate,
and a higher matching rate means a better targeted transfer
rate [39].
The transfer rate of AEs depends on two factors. One is
the model-related parameters, including the model architec-
ture, model capacity, and test accuracy. The transfer rate of
AEs is high among models with similar architecture, low
model capacity (the number of model parameters) and high
test accuracy [40]. Another factor is the magnitude of the
adversarial perturbation. Within a certain perturbation range,
the transfer rate of AEs is proportional to the magnitude of
adversarial perturbations, i.e., the greater perturbations to the
original example, the higher transfer rate of the constructed
AE. The minimum perturbation required for different methods
of constructing AEs is different.
4) Perturbations: Too small perturbations on the original
examples are difficult to construct AEs, while too large per-
turbations are easily distinguished by human eyes. Therefore,
perturbations need to achieve a balance between constructing
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Fig. 7. The structural similarity (SSIM) measurement system [41].
AEs and the human visual system. For example, it is difficult
to control the perturbation for FGSM [27] which incurs label
leaking easily. To address the issue, Kurakin et al. proposed
an optimized FGSM based on the iterative method [33] which
can control the perturbation within a threshold range. Hence,
the success rate of constructing AEs is improved significantly.
However, the transfer rate of such AEs is low. Later on, a
saliency map-based method [31] is proposed to improve the
transfer rate. The key steps include: 1) direction sensitivity
estimation: evaluate the sensitivity of each class for each
input feature; 2) perturbation selection: use the sensitivity
information to select a minimum perturbation δ among the
input dimension which is most likely to misclassify the model.
In general, L2 norm is used to measure the perturbation of
the AE and is defined as
d(X
′
,X) = ||X′ − X||2 =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(X
′
i −Xi)2, (7)
where the n-dimensional vectors X and X
′
represent the
original example and AE respectively, d(X
′
,X) is the distance
metric between X and X
′
. It shows that the larger d(X
′
,X)
to the original example, the greater perturbations needed to
construct AEs.
5) Perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS): AEs are
visually recognized by humans as correct classes while being
misclassified by the models. Since the human visual system
is sensitive to structural changes, Wang et al. [41] proposed
the structural similarity (SSIM) index as a metric to measure
the similarity between two images. Luminance and contrast
associated with the object structure are defined as the structure
information of the image.
The structure of the SSIM measurement system is shown
in Fig. 7. For two different aligned images X1 and X2, the
SSIM measurement system consists of three comparisons:
luminance, contrast, and structure. First, the luminance of each
image is compared. Second, the standard deviation (the square
root of variance) is used as an estimate of the contrast of each
image. Third, the image is normalized by its own standard
deviation as an estimate of the structure comparison. Finally,
the three components are combined to produce an overall
similarity measure. Therefore, the structural similarity between
image signal X and image signal Y can be modeled as
SSIM(X,Y) =
1
m
m∑
n=1
[L(Xn, Yn)
αC(Xn, Yn)
βS(Xn, Yn)
γ ],
(8)
where m is the number of pixels; L, C, and S are the
luminance, contrast, and structure of the image, respectively;
hyper-parameters α, β and γ are used to weight the relative
importance of L, C, and S, respectively; the default setting is
α = β = γ = 1.
Based on SSIM measurement system, Perceptual Adversar-
ial Similarity Score (PASS) is proposed to quantify human
perception of AEs [42]. The PASS between X and X
′
is defined
as
PASS(X
′
,X) = SSIM(ψ(X
′
,X),X), (9)
where ψ(X
′
,X) represents the homography transform (a map-
ping from one plane to another) from the original image
X to the adversarial image X
′
. PASS can quantify the AEs
by measuring the similarity of the original image and the
adversarial image. An appropriate PASS threshold can be set to
distinguish the AEs with excessive perturbations. Meanwhile,
attackers can also use the PASS threshold to optimize the
methods of constructing AEs. Therefore, constructing an AE
should satisfy
arg min
d(X,X′ )
X
′
: f(X
′
) 6= y and PASS(X,X′) ≥ θ, (10)
where d(X,X
′
) is some dissimilarity measure, f(X
′
) 6= y
represents that the AE is misclassified by the model, θ is
the PASS threshold set by the attacker, PASS(X,X
′
) ≥ θ
represents that the AE is not recognized by the human eyes.
D. Adversarial Abilities and Adversarial Goals
Adversarial ability is determined by how well attackers un-
derstand the model. Threat models in deep learning system are
classified into the following types according to the attacker’s
abilities.
White-box attack. Attackers know everything related to
trained neural network models, including training data, model
parameters and model architectures.
Grey-box attack. Attackers know some model information
such as model architectures, learning rate, training data and
training steps, except model parameters. This attack is a
byproduct of black-box attack and is not common in practical
applications.
Black-box attack. Attackers do not know the architecture
and parameters of the machine learning model, but can interact
with the machine learning system. For example, the outputs
can be determined by classifying random test vectors. Attack-
ers utilize the transferability of AE to train an alternative model
to construct AEs first, and then use the generated AEs to attack
the unknown target model.
The process of black-box attack is shown in Fig. 8. First,
attackers use the known dataset to train an alternative model.
Then, attackers construct the corresponding AEs through the
alternative model. Finally, these AEs can be used to attack the
unknown target model due to the transferability. However, in
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Fig. 8. Black-box attack. Alternative model: attackers know the model
architecture and parameters; targeted model: attackers do not know the model
architecture and parameters.
some scenarios such as machine learning as a service, it is
difficult to obtain the structure and parameters of the target
model and training dataset. Papernot et al. [29] proposed
a practical black-box attack method to generate AEs. The
specific process is as follows:
1) Attackers use the target model as an oracle to construct
a synthetic dataset, where the inputs are synthetically
generated and the outputs are labels observed from the
oracle.
2) Attackers select a machine learning algorithm randomly
and use the synthetic dataset to train a substitute model.
3) Attackers generate AEs through the substitute model.
4) Based on the transferability, attackers use the generated
AEs to attack the unknown target model.
The goal of adversarial deep learning is to misclassify the
model. According to the different influence of the perturbation
on the classifier, we classify the adversarial goals into four
types:
(1) Confidence reduction: reduce the confidence of output
classification.
(2) Non-targeted misclassification: alter the output classi-
fication to any class which is different from the original
class.
(3) Targeted misclassification: force the output classifica-
tion to be the specific target class.
(4) Source/Target misclassification: select a specific input
to generate a specific target class.
As shown in Fig. 9, the vertical axis represents the adver-
sarial abilities which include architecture, training data, oracle
(the adversary can obtain output classifications from provided
inputs and observe the relationship between changes in inputs
and outputs to adaptively construct adversarial examples), and
samples (the adversary has the ability to collect input and
output pairs, but cannot modify these inputs to observe the
difference in the output). The horizontal axis represents the
adversarial goals, and the increasing complexity from left to
right is confidence reduction, non-targeted misclassification,
targeted misclassification, and source/target misclassification.
In general, the weaker the adversarial ability or the higher the
adversarial goal, the more difficult it is for the model to be
attacked.
IV. METHODS OF CONSTRUCTING AES
In what follows, several typical AE construction methods
will be introduced in detail.
A. Mainstream Attack Methods
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Fig. 9. Adversarial abilities and adversarial goals [31].
Szegedy et al. [24] proposed L-BFGS (Limited-memory;
Broy-den, Fletcher, Goldforb, Shanno) to construct AEs. Given
an image X, attackers construct an image X
′
similar to X
with L2 norm and X
′
can be labeled as a different class. The
optimization problem is
minimize ||X − X′ ||2, (11)
where ||X−X′ ||2 is L2 norm. The goal of the attack is to make
f(X
′
) = l,X
′ ∈ [0, 1]n, where l is the target class. f(X′) = l
is the nonlinear and non-convex function which is difficult to
be solved directly. Therefore, the box-constrained L-BFGS is
used for approximately solving the following problem:
minimize c · ||X − X′ ||2 + lossF,l(X′), (12)
where c is a randomly initialized hyper-parameter, which is
determined by linear search; lossF,l(∗) is the loss function.
f(X
′
) = l is approximated by minimizing the loss function.
Although this method is high stability and effectiveness, the
calculation is complicated.
2) FGSM
Goodfellow et al. [27] proposed a simplest and fastest
method to construct AEs, named fast gradient sign method
(FGSM). The generated images are misclassified by adding
perturbations and linearizing the cost function in the gradient
direction. Given an original image X, the problem can be
solved with
Xadv = X +  sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue)), (13)
where Xadv represents an AE from X,  is a randomly
initialized hyper-parameter, sign(∗) is a sign function, ytrue
is the true label corresponding to X, and J(∗) is the cost
function used to train the neural network, ∇XJ(∗) represents
the gradient of X.
There are two main differences between FGSM and L-
BFGS. First, FGSM is optimized with the L∞ norm. Second,
FGSM is a fast AE construction method because it does
not require an iterative procedure to compute AEs. Hence
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Fig. 10. Saliency map S with the 28×28 image pixel, large absolute values
correspond to features with a significant impact on the output when perturbed
the input [31].
it has lower computation cost than other methods. However,
FGSM is prone to label leaking. Therefore, Kurakin et al. [32]
proposed FGSM-pred which uses the predicted label ypred
instead of true label ytrue. Researchers [32] also use the
gradients with L2 and L∞ norm, i.e., sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue))
is changed to ∇XJ(X,ytrue)||∇XJ(X,ytrue)||2 and
∇XJ(X,ytrue)
||∇XJ(X,ytrue)||∞ , these
two methods are named as Fast grad.L2 and Fast grad.L∞,
respectively.
3) IGSM
It is difficult for FGSM to control the perturbation in
constructing AEs. Kurakin et al. [33] proposed an optimized
FGSM, named iterative gradient sign method (IGSM), which
applies perturbations to multiple smaller steps and clips the
results after each iteration to ensure that the perturbations are
within the neighborhood of the original image. For the N-th
iteration, the update process is
Xadv0 = X, X
adv
N+1 = ClipX,{XadvN +
α sign(∇XJ(XadvN , ytrue))},
(14)
where ClipX,(∗) denotes [X − ,X + ].
IGSM is non-linear in the gradient direction and requires
multiple iterations, which is simpler than L-BFGS method
in calculation, and the success rate of AE construction is
higher than FGSM. IGSM can be further divided into two
types: 1) reducing the confidence of the original prediction
as the original class; 2) increasing the confidence of the
prediction that originally belongs to the class with the smallest
probability. The iterative least-likely class method that will be
introduced in the next section is the second case.
Recently, Dong et al. [50] proposed a momentum iterative
method (MIM). The basic idea is to add momentum based on
the IGSM. The weakness of previous iterative attacks is that
the transferability (black-box attack) is weakened when the
number of iterations increases, which can be addressed after
adding momentum. MIM attack not only enhances the attack
ability on the white-box model, but also increases the success
rate on the black-box model. The momentum iterative gradient
sign method for the targeted attack is given by
gt+1 = µgt +
∇XJ(Xadvt , ytarget)
||∇XJ(Xadvt , ytarget)||1
,
Xadvt+1 = ClipX,(X
adv
t + α sign(gt+1)),
(15)
where gt gathers the gradients of the first t iterations with a
decay factor µ, and its initial value is 0.
4) Iterl.l
FGSM and L-BFGS try to increase the probability of
predicting wrong results but do not specify which wrong
class should be selected by the model. These methods are
sufficient for small datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10.
On ImageNet, with a larger number of classes and varying
degrees of significance between classes, FGSM and L-BFGS
may construct uninteresting misclassifications, such as mis-
classifying one type of cat into another cat. To generate more
meaningful AEs, a novel AE generation method is proposed by
perturbing the target class with the lowest probability so that
this least-likely class turns to become the correct class after
the perturbation, which is called as iterative least-likely class
method (iterl.l) [33]. To make the adversarial image Xadv be
classified as yLL, we have the following procedure:
Xadv0 = X, X
adv
N+1 = ClipX,{XadvN −
α sign(∇XJ(XadvN , yLL))},
(16)
where yLL represents the least likely (the lowest probability)
target class. For a classifier with good performance, the least
likely class is usually quite different from the correct class.
Therefore, this attack method can lead to some interesting
errors, such as misclassifying a cat as an aircraft. It is also
possible to use a random class as the target class, which is
called as iteration random class method.
5) JSMA
Papernot et al. [31] proposed the Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA), which is based on the L0 distance norm.
The basic idea is to construct a saliency map with the gradients
and model the gradients based on the impact of each pixel.
The gradients are directly proportional to the probability that
the image is classified as the target class, i.e., changing a pixel
with a larger gradient will significantly increase the likelihood
that the model classifies the image as the target class. JSMA
allows us to select the most important pixel (the maximum
gradient) based on the saliency map and then perturb the pixel
to increase the likelihood of labeling the image as the target
class. More specifically, JSMA includes the following steps:
(1) Compute forward derivative ∇F (X).
∇F (X) = ∂F (X)
∂X
= [
∂Fj(X)
∂Xi
]
i∈1...M,j∈1...N
. (17)
(2) Construct a saliency map S based on the forward deriva-
tive, as shown in Fig. 10.
(3) Modify the most important pixel based on the saliency
map, repeat this process until the output is the target class
or the maximum perturbation is got.
When the model is sensitive to the change of inputs, JSMA
is easier to calculate the minimum perturbation to generate
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f(X)>0
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X0
Fig. 11. Adversarial examples for a linear binary classifier [45].
the AEs. JSMA has high computational complexity while the
generated AEs have a high success rate and transfer rate.
6) DeepFool
Mohsen et al. [45] proposed a non-targeted attack method
based on the L2 norm, called DeepFool. Assuming that
the neural network is completely linear, there must be a
hyperplane separating one class from another. Based on this
assumption, we analyze the optimal solution to this problem
and construct AEs. The corresponding optimization problem
is
r∗(X0) = arg min ||r||2, (18)
subject to sign(f(X0 + r)) 6= sign(f(X0)), where r indicates
the perturbation.
As shown in Fig. 11, X0 is the original example, f(X) is
a linear binary classifier, the straight line WX + b = 0 is the
decision boundary, and r∗(X) is the distance from the original
example to the decision boundary, i.e., the distance from X0 to
the straight line WX+b = 0. The distance is equivalent to the
perturbation ∆(X0; f). Therefore, when ∆(X0; f) > r∗(X),
the AE can be generated.
Compared with L-BFGS, DeepFool is more efficient and
powerful. The basic idea is to find the decision boundary
that is the closest to X in the image space, and then use
the boundary to fool the classifier. It is difficult to solve
this problem directly in neural networks with high dimension
and nonlinear space. Therefore, a linearized approximation is
used to iteratively solve this problem. The approximation is to
linearize the intermediate X0 classifier in each iteration, and
obtain an optimal update direction on the linearized model.
Then X0 is iteratively updated in this direction by a small
step α, repeating the linear update process until X0 crosses
the decision boundary. Finally, AEs can be constructed with
subtle perturbations.
7) Universal Adversarial Perturbations
FGSM, JSMA and DeepFool can only generate adversarial
perturbations to fool a network on a single image. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [46] proposed a universal image-agnostic
perturbation attack method which fools classifiers by single
adversarial perturbation to all images. The specific problem
can be defined as finding a universal perturbation v, such that
kˆ(X + v) 6= kˆ(X) for most examples in the dataset subject to
the distribution µ and can be expressed as
kˆ(X + v) 6= kˆ(X) for “most” X ∼ µ, (19)
where kˆ denotes a classification function that labels each im-
age. Such perturbation v is called as the universal perturbation.
Attackers’ goal is to find the v that satisfies the following two
constraints: 1. ||v||p ≤ §,2. P
X∼µ
(
kˆ(X + v) 6= kˆ(X)
)
≥ 1− δ, (20)
where || · ||p denotes the p-norm, the parameter § controls
the magnitude of the perturbation v, and δ quantifies the
desired fooling rate for all images. The attack method has
two characteristics: 1) the perturbation is related to the target
model rather than the image; 2) the small perturbation will not
change the structure of the image itself.
8) CW Attack (C&W)
Carlini and Wagner [47] proposed a powerful attack method
based on L-BFGS. The attack with L0, L2, L∞ distance norm
can be targeted or non-targeted, and we take the non-targeted
L2 norm as an example here. The corresponding optimization
problem is
minimize ||δ||2 + c · f(X + δ), (21)
where X+δ ∈ [0, 1]n, c is a hyper-parameter that can balance
these two terms, and δ is a small perturbation. The objective
function f(X
′
) is defined as
f(X
′
) = max(max{Z(X′)i : i 6= t} − Z(X
′
)t,−l), (22)
where Z(X
′
) is the last hidden layer, t is the true label,
and l is a hyper-parameter, which is used to control the
confidence level of the model misclassification, and the AE
X
′
can be classified as t with high confidence by adjusting
the value of l. In general, high confidence attacks have large
perturbations and high transfer rates, and CW Attack based
on the L0, L2, L∞ distance metric can defeat the defensive
distillation [63]. There are three improvements to this attack
based on L-BFGS:
• Use the gradient of the actual output in the model instead
of the gradient of softmax.
• Apply different distance metrics (L0, L2, L∞).
• Apply different objective functions f(X
′
).
9) Ensemble Attack
Liu et al. [39] proposed an ensemble attack method combin-
ing multiple models to construct AEs. If an adversarial image
remains adversarial for multiple models, it is likely to be trans-
ferred to other models. Formally, given k white-box models
with softmax outputs being J1, ..., Jk, an original image X
and its true label y, the ensemble-based approach solves the
following optimization problem (for targeted attack):
arg min
X′
− log((
k∑
i=1
αiJi(X
′
)) · 1y′ ) + λd(X,X
′
), (23)
where y
′
is the target label specified by the attacker,∑k
i=1 αiJi(X
′
) is the ensemble model, and αi is the weight
of the i-th model,
∑k
i=1 αi = 1, λ is a randomly initialized
parameter that is used to control the weight of the two terms.
The goal is to ensure the generated AEs are still adversarial for
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TABLE I
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT ATTACK METHODS
Method Advantage Disadvantage
L-BFGS [24] High stability and effectiveness High computational and time complexity
FGSM [27] Low computational complexity, high transfer rate Low success rate, label leaking
IGSM [33] Small perturbations, high success rate Low transfer rate, low success rate for balck-box attacks
Iter.l.l [33] Small perturbations, high success rate Low transfer rate, low success rate for balck-box attacks
JSMA [31] Small perturbations, high success rate High computational complexity
Uni.perturbations [46] High generalization ability, high transfer rate The perturbation is not easy to control,low success rate for target attacks
DeepFool [45] Low computational complexity, small perturbations Low success rate for balck-box attacks
One-pixel [53] Low computational complexity Low success rate for target attacks, large perturbations
CW Attack [47] Small perturbations, high transfer rate and success rate High computational complexity
Ensemble Attack [39] Simple computation, good generalization Low success rate for balck-box attacks
the other black-box model Jk+1. Since the decision boundaries
for different models are almost the same, the transferability of
targeted AEs is improved significantly.
B. Other Attack Methods
From the perspective of attackers, the goal of the attack
is to construct strong AEs with small perturbations and fool
the model with high confidence without being recognized by
human eyes. Recently, in addition to typical AE construction
methods introduced above, a lot of other attack methods have
been proposed [48], [49]. Xia et al. [51] proposed AdvGAN to
construct AEs. The basic idea is to use generative adversarial
networks to construct targeted AEs, which not only learns
and preserves the distribution of the original examples, but
also guarantees the diversity of perturbations and enhances
generalization ability significantly. Tramr et al. [52] proposed
an ensemble attack RAND + FGSM. First, they added a
small random perturbation RAND to “escape” the non-smooth
vicinity of the data point before computing the gradients. Then,
they applied the FGSM to enhance the attack ability greatly.
Compared with the FGSM, this method has a higher success
rate and can effectively avoid label leaking. Su et al. [53] pro-
posed a one pixel attack method which only changes one pixel
for each image to construct AEs to fool DNNs. However, such
simple perturbation can be recognized by human eyes easily.
Weng et al. [54] proposed a computationally feasible method
called Cross Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness
(CLEVER), which applies extreme value theory to estimate
a lower bound of the minimum adversarial perturbation re-
quired to misclassify the image. CLEVER is the first attack-
independent method and can evaluate the intrinsic robustness
of neural networks. Brown et al. [55] proposed adversarial
patch which does not need to subtly transform an existing im-
age into another and can be placed anywhere within the field of
view of the classifier to cause the classifier to output a targeted
class. Li et al. [56] studied the security of real-world cloud-
based image detectors, including AWS, Azure, Google Cloud,
Baidu Cloud and Alibaba Cloud. Specifically, they proposed
TABLE II
THE SUCCESS RATE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Method
Type Targeted Non-targeted
L-BFGS [24] 96.1% NA
FGSM [27] NA 74.6%
IGSM [33] 85.4% 99.1%
MIM [50] 99.3% 100%
DeepFool [45] NA 100%
CW Attack [47] 93.2% 98.4%
Uni.perturbations [46] NA 88.2%
JSMA∗ [31] - -
∗ Out of Memory.
four different attacks based on semantic segmentation, which
generate semantics-aware adversarial examples by interacting
only with the black-box APIs.
As discussed above, many AE attacks have been proposed
in recent years. We summarized the advantages and disadvan-
tages of several typical attack methods in Table I.
V. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS ATTACK METHODS
In this section, we compare the attributes of dif-
ferent attack methods in terms of black/white-box, at-
tack type, targeted/non-targeted and PASS. Then we con-
duct a lot of experiments to compare the success rate
and the transfer rate for different attack methods. The
code to reproduce our experiments is available online at
http://hardwaresecurity.cn/SurveyAEcode.zip.
A. Experimental Setup
Platform. All the experiments are conducted on a machine
equipped with an AMD Threadripper 1920X CPU, a NVIDIA
GTX 1050Ti GPU and 16G memory, and implemented in
tensorflow-gpu 1.6.0 with Python 3.6.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ATTACK METHODS ON ATTRIBUTES
Method Black/White-box Attack Type Targeted/Non-targeted PASS
L-BFGS [24] White-box Gradient-based Targeted ∗
FGSM [27] White-box Gradient-based Non-targeted ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
IGSM [33] White-box Gradient-based Targeted/Non-targeted ∗∗
Iter.l.l [33] White-box Gradient-based Non-targeted ∗∗
JSMA [31] White-box Gradient-based Targeted ∗∗
Uni.perturbations [46] White-box Decision boundary-based Non-targeted ∗ ∗ ∗
DeepFool [45] White-box Decision boundary-based Non-targeted ∗
One-pixel [53] Black-box - Non-targeted ∗ ∗ ∗∗
CW Attack [47] White-box Iterative optimization Targeted/Non-targeted ∗
Ensemble Attack [39] White-box Ensemble optimization Non-targeted ∗ ∗ ∗
TABLE IV
THE TRANSFER RATE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Method
Model Targeted/Non-targeted A→B A→C A→D A→E Perturbations(P )
L-BFGS [24] Targeted 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 1.02
FGSM [27] Non-targeted 66.8% 51.9% 51.5% 64.8% 15.23
IGSM [33] Targeted 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 8.87
Non-targeted 39.9% 34.4% 33.7% 46.7% 8.85
MIM [50] Targeted 0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 13.55
Non-targeted 56.4% 45.4% 44.8% 59.9% 13.54
DeepFool [45] Non-Targeted 30.5% 16.6% 10.5% 16.7% 0.49
CW Attack [47] Targeted 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.78
Non-targeted 4.3% 3.9% 2.9% 5.3% 0.76
Uni.perturbations [46] Non-targeted 44.2% 29.1% 23.2% 35.4% 6.01
JSMA∗ [31] Targeted - - - - -
∗ Out of Memory.
Dataset. All of the experiments described in this section are
performed on ILSVRC 2012 dataset [57]. The ILSVRC 2012
dataset is a subset of ImageNet, containing about 1000 images
of 1000 categories. The examples are split among a training
set of approximately 1.2 million examples, a validation set
of 50,000 and a test set of 150,000. In our experiments,
we randomly select 1000 images from 1000 categories in
the ILSVRC 2012 validation set. The size of each image is
299×299×3. The intensity values of pixels in all these images
are scaled to a real number in [0, 1].
DNN Model. For the dataset, we evaluate the success
rate and transfer rate of AEs on five popular deep network
architectures: Inception V3 [58], AlexNet [59], ResNet34 [60],
DenseNet20 [61] and VGG19 [62], which are pretrained by
the ImageNet dataset.
B. Comparison of Different Attack Methods on Attributes
Table III summarizes the attribute information of main-
stream attacks. We find that: 1) most of the attack methods
are white-box attacks. In the scenario of black-box attacks,
attackers are difficult to construct AE attacks on machine
learning models; 2) most of the mainstream attacks are based
on the gradient. Later on, other attacks such as decision
boundary, iterative optimization and ensemble optimization are
proposed; 3) the more asterisks, the larger the value of PASS,
i.e., the generated AEs are easier to be perceived by human
eyes. For example, since FGSM is prone to the label leakage
effect, the best perturbation to generate AEs is large (i.e., the
PASS is large) and hence the generated AEs are easier to be
perceived.
C. The Success Rate
The success rate of various AE construction methods for
targeted and non-targeted attacks on the Inception V3 model
is evaluated. As shown in Table II, the success rate of targeted
attacks is lower than the non-targeted attacks for the same AE
construction method, and MIM has the highest success rate
for target and non-target attacks. Note that JSMA needs to
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calculate the forward derivative of each pixel in the image to
construct the Jacobian matrix. Therefore, JSMA is computa-
tionally expensive. In the experiment, we do not report the
success rate and transfer rate for JSMA because it runs out of
memory on the big dataset.
D. The Transfer Rate
The transfer rates of typical AEs for targeted and non-
targeted attacks among the five models (Inception V3 (A),
AlexNet (B), ResNet (C), DenseNet (D) and VGG (E)) are
shown in Table IV. Inception V3 is used as the source model
and the other models are used as the target models. We collect
1000 adversarial images generated by each AE construction
method in Inception V3 and apply them to other models to test
the transfer rate of AEs. For each AE construction method, we
define the average perturbation P as
P =
∑N
i=1
∑R
r=1
∑C
c=1
∑L
l=1 abs(pixel
ori
i,r,c,l − pixeladvi,r,c,l)
N ×R× C × L ,
(24)
where N , R, C and L are the number of images, rows,
columns and layers respectively, pixelori(adv)i,r,c,l is the pixel
value of row r, column c, and layer l of original (adversarial)
image i. abs(pixelorii,r,c,l− pixeladvi,r,c,l) is the absolute value of
(pixelorii,r,c,l − pixeladvi,r,c,l). The magnitude of the perturbation
is proportional to the transfer rate, i.e., the greater the pertur-
bation, the higher the transfer rate. In addition, we find that
the transfer rate of AE construction methods is low, i.e., the
transfer rates of most of targeted attacks are less than 0.5%,
which means that it is difficult to conduct AE attacks in the
real black-box scenario and it is urgent to develop AE attack
methods with a high transfer rate.
VI. DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
AEs bring a great threat to the security-critical AI appli-
cations such as face payment [64], medical systems [65] and
autonomous vehicles [66], [67] based on image recognition
in deep learning. Vulnerability to AEs is not unique to deep
learning. All machine learning models are vulnerable to AEs
[29]. Therefore, defending against AEs is urgent for machine
learning security. In this section, we will briefly describe
the basic goals of defending against AEs, then detail the
current defense techniques and their limitations. Finally, some
suggestions are presented for future research work on the
problems of the current defense techniques.
A. Defense Goals
Generally, there are four defense goals:
1) Low impact on the model architecture: when construct-
ing any defense against AEs, the primary consideration
is the minimal modification to model architectures.
2) Maintain model speed: running time is very important
for the availability of DNNs. It should not be affected
during testing. With the deployment of defenses, DNNs
should still maintain high performance on large datasets.
3) Maintain accuracy: defenses should have little impact
on the classification accuracy of models.
4) Defenses should be targeted: defenses should be ef-
fective for the examples that are relatively close to the
training set. Since the examples that are far from the
dataset are relatively secure, the perturbations to these
examples are easily detected by the classifier.
B. Current Defenses
1) Adversarial Training
AEs have been used to improve the anti-interference ability
for AI models. In 2015, Goodfellow et al. [27] proposed the
adversarial training to improve the robustness of the model.
The basic idea is to add AEs to the training data and con-
tinuously generate new AEs at each step of the training. The
number and relative weight of AEs in each batch is controlled
by the loss function independently. The corresponding loss
function [32] is
LOSS =
1
(m− k) + λk (
∑
i∈CLEAN
L(Xi|yi)+
λ
∑
i∈ADV
L(Xadvi |yi)),
(25)
where L(X|y) is a loss function of the example X with a true
label y, m is the total number of training examples, k is the
number of AEs, and λ is a hyper-parameter used to control
the relative weight of the AEs in the loss function. When
k = 0.5m, i.e., when the number of AEs is the same as the
number of original examples, the model has the best effect in
the adversarial training.
Adversarial training is not the same as data augmentation.
The augmented data may appear in the test set, while AEs
are usually not shown in the test set but can reveal the
defects of the model. Adversarial training can be viewed as
the process of minimizing classification error rates when the
data is maliciously perturbed. In the following two situations,
it is suggested to use adversarial training:
i) Overfitting: when a model is overfitting, a regularization
term is needed.
ii) Security: when AEs refer to security problems, adversar-
ial training is the most secure method among all known
defenses with only a small loss of accuracy.
Although a model is robust to white-box attacks after
adversarial training, it is still vulnerable to the AEs generated
from other models, i.e., the model is not robust to black-box
attacks. Based on this attribute, Tramr et al. [52] proposed the
concept of ensemble adversarial training. The main idea is to
augment the training data which constructed not only from
the model being trained but also from the other pre-trained
models, which increases the diversity of AEs and improves
the generalization ability.
2) Defensive Distillation
Adversarial training needs AEs to train the model, thus the
defense is related to the process of AEs construction. For
any defense, the defense effect is quite different for different
attack methods. In 2016, Papernot et al. [63] proposed a uni-
versal defensive method for neural networks, which is called
defensive distillation. The distillation method uses a small
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Fig. 12. The pipeline of defensive distillation. The initial network is trained
at temperature T on the training set (X,Y (X)), the distilled network is trained
at the same temperature T on the new training set (X,F (X)) [63].
model to simulate a large and computationally intensive model
without affecting the accuracy and can solve the problem of
information missing. Different from the traditional distillation
technique, defensive distillation aims to smooth the model
during the training process by generalizing examples outside
the training data. The specific training steps are shown in Fig.
12.
i) The probability vectors produced by the first DNN are
used to label the dataset. These new labels are called soft
labels as opposed to hard class labels.
ii) The dataset to train the second DNN model can be the
newly labeled data or a combination of hard and soft
labels. Since the second model combines the knowledge
of the first model, it has smaller size, better robustness
and smaller computational complexity.
The basic idea of defensive distillation is to generate smooth
classifiers that are more resilient to AEs, reducing the sensitiv-
ity of the DNN to the input perturbation. In addition, defensive
distillation improves the generalization ability because it does
not modify the neural network architecture. Therefore, it has
low training overhead and no testing overhead. Although
attack methods [36], [47] have demonstrated that the defensive
distillation does not improve the robustness of neural networks
significantly, the following three methods are still a good
research direction for defending AEs:
(i) Consider defensive distillation under different types of
the perturbation (FGSM, L-BFGS, etc.);
(ii) Investigate the effect of distillation on other DNN models
and AE constructing algorithms;
(iii) Study various distance metrics such as L0, L2, L∞ be-
tween the original examples and the AEs.
3) Detector
Adversarial training is proposed to enhance the robustness
of the model. However, this method lacks generalization ability
and is difficult to popularize. Defensive distillation is proposed
to defend AEs but defeated by a strong CW Attack. In 2017,
Lu et al. [68] proposed an RBF-SVM based detector to detect
whether the input is normal or adversarial (as shown in Fig.
13). The detector can get the internal state of some back layers
in the original classification neural network. If the detector
finds out that the example is an adversarial example, then it
will be rejected.
We assume that the detector is difficult to be attacked,
and the output of ReLU activation function is processed in
Fig. 13. SafeNet architecture. SafetyNet consists of a conventional classifier
with an RBF-SVM that uses discrete codes to detect adversarial examples [68].
the binary format. Since normal examples and AEs generate
different binary codes, detectors can compare the code during
the test to determine whether the input is normal or adversarial.
At present, AE detectors are mainly divided into the fol-
lowing classes [69]:
Detection Based on Secondary Classification. Generally,
there are two kinds of secondary classification detection meth-
ods. One is the adversarial training detector [70], [71], which
is similar to adversarial training. The main idea is to add a new
classification label to AEs during training. If an AE is detected,
the model will classify it into a new class. Another is to take
the characteristics extracted from AEs and original examples
during the convolution layer as input. Then the labeled input
data is used to train neural network detectors. This method
performed well on detecting over 85% of AEs.
Detection Based on Principal Component Analysis
(PCA). The essence of PCA is to transform the original
features linearly and map them to a low-dimensional space
with the best possible representation of the original features.
PCA-based detection methods are mainly divided into two
types. The first one uses PCA in the input layer due to
the greater weight of AEs processed by PCA than original
examples [72]. The second one uses PCA in the hidden layer
[73]. If the result of each hidden layer matches the feature
of original examples, the detector will classify the input as
original examples.
Detection Based on Distribution. There are two main
distribution-based detection methods. The first one uses the
maximum mean discrepancy [70] which measures the distance
between two different but related distributions. Assuming that
there are two sets of images S1 and S2, S1 contains all the
original examples, S2 contains either all AEs or all original
examples. If S1 and S2 have the same distribution, then S2 has
original examples; otherwise, S2 is full of AEs. The second
one uses kernel density estimation [74]. Since AEs have a
different density distribution from the original examples, they
can be detected with high confidence by the estimation of the
density ratio. If the density ratio of one example is close to 1,
it belongs to the original example. If the density ratio is much
larger than 1, it belongs to AEs.
Other Detection Methods. Dropout randomization [30] is a
method to use dropout randomly during AE detection. Original
examples always generate correct labels, but AEs are of high
possibility to be different from the label corresponding to
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TABLE V
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DEFENSES
Type Method Advantages Disadvantages
Modified training/input
Adversarial training [27]
Simple, good defensive ability Difficult to converge, high overheadData compression [76]
Data randomization [77]
Modifying the network
Deep Contractive Networks [78]
Low overhead, good generalization Model-dependent, high complexityGradient masking [79]
Defensive distillation [63]
Network add-ons GAN-based [80] Low complexity, model-independent Weak generalization, not improving the robustnessDetection [68]
original examples. In addition, another method called Mean
Blur [73] uses the filter to perform mean blurring on the input
image and can effectively improve the robustness of models.
C. Other Defense Techniques
Defenders’ goal is to train a model where no AEs exist
or AEs cannot be easily generated. Recently, some novel
researches on defending AEs have been proposed. Meng et
al. [43] proposed a framework MagNet, including one or
more separate detector networks and one reformer network.
The detector network learns to distinguish normal examples
from AEs by approximating normal examples. The reformer
network moves AEs towards the normal examples. As MagNet
is independent of the process of constructing AEs, hence it
is effective in the black-box and gray-box attacks. Dong et
al. [50] proposed a high-level representation guided denoiser
method which requires fewer training images and consumes
less training time than previous defense methods at the expense
of a reduced success rate. Ma et al. [75] proposed Local
Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) to describe the dimensional
attributes of the adversarial subspace in the AEs and proved
that these features can distinguish normal examples from AEs
effectively. Baluja et al. [81] proposed adversarial transforma-
tion networks (ATNs) to increase the diversity of perturbations
to improve the effectiveness of adversarial training. However,
ATNs may produce similar perturbations to iterative methods
which are not suitable for adversarial training. In addition,
hardware security primitives such as physical unclonable func-
tions [82]–[85] can be used to randomize the model to assist
the AE detection.
D. Limitations of Defenses
As discussed above, a lot of defenses have been proposed.
In what follows, we summarize their advantages and disad-
vantages.
As shown in Table V, adversarial training is simple and
can significantly improve the robustness of models. However,
AEs are required in the training process, which brings high
overhead. Besides, it is difficult to theoretically explain which
attack method to construct AEs for adversarial training can
achieve the best robustness of models. Defensive distillation
can greatly reduce the sensitivity to perturbations without
modifying the neural network architectures. Therefore, defen-
sive distillation incurs low overhead in training and testing.
However, defensive distillation needs to add distillation tem-
perature and modify the objective function, which increases
the complexity of designing defensive models. Besides, at-
tackers can easily bypass the defensive distillation by the
following three strategies: 1) choose a more suitable objective
function; 2) calculate the final layer of gradient instead of
the second-to-last layer of gradient; 3) attack a fragile model
and then transfer to the distillation model. Detectors do not
need to modify the model architecture and parameters, hence
the complexity is low. However, its performance is highly
correlated with the type of detector. In addition, this method
only detects the existence of AEs and does not improve the
robustness of the model.
VII. RECENT CHALLENGES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES
AE construction and defense are one of the research
hotspots in the AI security field. Although many AE construc-
tion methods and defense techniques have been proposed, var-
ious unresolved problems still exist. This section summarizes
the challenges to this field and put forward to some future
research directions.
In term of AE construction, there are three major challenges:
1) It is difficult to build a generalized AE construction
method. In recent years, a lot of AE-construction methods
have been proposed, such as the gradient-based FGSM, JSMA,
the decision boundary-based DeepFool and the ensemble at-
tack method combining multiple models. These methods are
difficult to construct a generalized AE and can only achieve
good performance in some evaluation metrics. Therefore,
defenders can propose efficient defenses against these specific
attacks. For example, the gradient can be hidden or obfuscated
to prevent against the gradient-based AE construction methods.
2) It is difficult to control the magnitude of perturba-
tion for target images. In the mainstream attack methods,
attackers construct AEs by perturbing target images to fool
neural network models. However, it is difficult to control the
magnitude of perturbations because too small perturbations
can not generate AEs and too large perturbations can be
perceived by human eyes easily.
3) AEs are difficult to maintain adversarial stability
in real-world applications. The image perturbed at specific
distances and angles may result in the misclassification of the
model. However, a lot of images perturbed at different dis-
tances and angles fail to fool the classifier [86]. Moreover, AEs
may lose their adversarial with physical transformation such
as blurring, rotation, scaling and illumination [87]. Actually, it
is hard for AEs to maintain stability in real-world applications.
Therefore, to address these issues, we propose to improve
AE quality in the following three directions.
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1) Construct AEs with a high transfer rate. With the
diversification of neural network models, the effectiveness
of attacks for a single model is not enough. Based on the
transferability, constructing AEs with a high transfer rate is a
prerequisite to evaluate the effectiveness of black-box attacks
and a key metric to evaluate generalized attacks.
2) Construct AEs without perturbing the target image.
When constructing AEs, the magnitude of perturbations to the
target image is determined by experiments. Hence, the optimal
perturbation will be different in various models. It increases
the complexity of attacks and affects the success rate and the
transfer rate. Therefore, constructing AEs without perturbing
the target image is a novel and challenging research direction.
3) Model the physical transformation. In the physical
world, attackers need to consider not only the magnitude of
the perturbations but also the physical transformations such as
translation, rotation, brightness, and contrast. However, it is
difficult for attackers to use traditional algorithms to generate
real-world AEs with high adversarial stability. Therefore,
modeling physical perturbations is an efficient way to improve
the stability of real-world AEs.
In terms of defending against AEs, there are two main
challenges at present.
1) Defense is highly related to model architectures
and parameters. The black-box attack does not need to
obtain model architecture and parameters to construct AEs.
Therefore, it is difficult for defenders to resist the black-box
attack by modifying the model architectures or parameters. For
example, defensive distillation needs to modify and retrain the
target classifier.
2) Weak generalization for defense models. Adversarial
training and detector are representative defense techniques.
Adversarial training can improve the robustness of the model
by adding AEs to the training set. The detector can detect
examples based on AEs in the dataset. However, the defense
effect is quite different when defending AEs generated by
different attack methods, i.e., the generalization ability of
defense models is weak.
VIII. CONCLUSION
DNNs have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance
on a variety of pattern recognition tasks. However, recent
researches show that DNNs, like many other machine learning
models, are vulnerable to AEs. Although many AE construc-
tion and defense methods have been proposed, there are still
some challenges to be solved. The state-of-the-art research
is still in the adversarial development stage of “while the
priest climbs a post, the devil climbs ten”. In this survey,
we review the state-of-the-art AE construction methods and
the corresponding defense techniques, then summarize several
challenges along with the future trends in this field. Although
AEs have caused the deep learning to be questioned, it
also prompts both academia and industry to understand the
difference between AI and our human brain better.
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